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I. Introduction
Pardon me for being one to state the obvious—but, the world is
changing.  Among the many who do not need that fact reiterated to 
them are officials in domestic and international law enforcement.  
Today, where a crime is committed, where a suspect is located, and 
where the evidence necessary to prosecute him or her exists are all 
often found in locations throughout all corners of the globe.1  In 
navigating this reality, law enforcement agencies around the world 
† J.D. Candidate 2019, University of North Carolina School of Law. 
1 Gail Kent, The Mutual Legal Assistance Problem Explained, THE CTR. FOR
INTERNET & SOC’Y (Feb. 23, 2015, 1:06 PM), 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/02/mutual-legal-assistance-problem-explained 
[https://perma.cc/6XAD-Q6GL]. 
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are forced to reach outside of their jurisdictional bounds to request 
data from various sources around the world.2  However, the legal 
framework that currently exists governing cross-border information 
sharing—Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (“MLATs”)—is 
woefully inadequate.3  As a result, countries have begun to look for 
workable alternatives to the existing process.4  The United States in 
particular has recently proposed legislation which would provide an 
alternative to the current MLAT regime and allow it to form direct, 
one-on-one information-sharing agreements with other countries, 
particularly the United Kingdom.5 
In this paper, I argue, specifically with respect to the recently 
proposed 2016 U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) legislation, that 
these sort of MLAT “workaround,” cross-border information 
sharing agreements are an effective alternative to the current MLAT 
regime.  They allow countries like the United States to more 
efficiently produce and request data from other countries, all the 
while ensuring adequate safeguards for the protection of human and 
privacy rights.  I first discuss the conditions which initially lead to 
the MLAT framework, but which have now increasingly made that 
framework unworkable.  I then go on to describe the current MLAT 
process, discuss its flaws as they exist currently, and argue that 
solutions like those recently proposed in the United States, 
including the 2016 DOJ legislation, are workable, alternative 
solutions to the current process.6 
 
 2 See id. 
 3 Drew Mitnick, The Urgent Need for MLAT Reform, ACCESS NOW (Sept. 12, 2014, 
5:42 PM), https://www.accessnow.org/the-urgent-needs-for-mlat-reform/ 
[https://perma.cc/52S2-PD9D]. 
 4 See id. 
 5 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGISLATION TO PERMIT THE SECURE & PRIVACY-
PROTECTIVE EXCHANGE OF ELECTRONIC DATA FOR THE PURPOSES OF COMBATING SERIOUS 
CRIME INCLUDING TERRORISM (2016), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2994379-2016-7-15-US-UK-Biden-With-
Enclosures.html#document/p1 [https://perma.cc/94A9-FMXL] [hereinafter DOJ 
Proposed Legislation]. 
 6 At the time of submission, the U.S. Congress had adopted many of the provisions 
of the 2016 DOJ proposed legislation in the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data 
(CLOUD) Act of 2018.  See Andrew Keane Woods & Peter Swire, The CLOUD Act: A 
Welcome Legislative Fix for Cross-Border Data Problems, LAWFARE (Feb. 6, 2018, 5:49 
PM), https://lawfareblog.com/cloud-act-welcome-legislative-fix-cross-border-data-
problems [https://perma.cc/CUA5-BUUW].  The Act was passed in an omnibus spending 
bill on March 23, and essentially “pave[d] the way for executive agreements—such as the 
contemplated U.S.-U.K. agreement—to allow foreign governments to request content 
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II. The Current Climate Surrounding International Cross-
Border Data Sharing 
Global technological change has reshaped the world in recent 
years.  Whether it be the effort to combat global climate change, or 
the ability of companies to invest in cheap labor markets and export 
products throughout the world, technological change is undoubtedly 
the spark plug that continuously ignites new developments in 
centuries old establishments and practices.  One such area that has 
been impacted dramatically as a result of this technological change 
is the area of criminal law enforcement.7  As advancements in 
technology allow individuals and countries to extend their reach 
beyond invisible, national borders, countries are struggling to 
navigate existing legal frameworks in an effort to catch defendants 
who commit crimes in jurisdictions where they may, or may not be 
physically present.8 
The reason the current legal system is inadequate in allowing 
law enforcement agencies around the world to catch criminals 
effectively, is due, in part, to the fact that many crimes are now 
committed in cyberspace.9  As a result, evidence of such crimes is 
generally found on data servers which may or may not be in the 
territorial jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency charged with 
investigating, and ultimately prosecuting, the crime.10  Most of the 
online service providers—like Google and Microsoft—which 
maintain the servers for which this evidence is located, are 
headquartered in the United States, but have offices and store data 
 
directly from American providers.”  Id.; see also Pete Williams, Supreme Court Seems Set 
to Rule Against Microsoft in Email Privacy Case, NBC NEWS (Feb. 27, 2018, 12:49 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/gov-t-battles-microsoft-email-privacy-
case-supreme-court-n851216 [https://perma.cc/V789-E8JS] (predicting a Supreme Court 
ruling against Microsoft, as expected from application of CLOUD Act).  The Act has many 
of the same provisions as the proposed DOJ legislation: it amends parts of the ECPA “to 
allow providers to permit disclosures to certain foreign governments[,]” and allows the 
president of the United States to enter into agreements with countries that meet a certain 
set of requirements. Woods & Swire, supra note 6 . However, for the purposes of this 
paper, the CLOUD Act itself is not considered because it adopts many of the provisions of 
the 2016 DOJ proposed legislation, and therefore my arguments similarly apply. 
 7 See Jennifer Daskal, Law Enforcement Access to Data Across Borders: The 
Evolving Security & Rights Issues, 8 J. OF NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 473 (2016). 
 8 Id. at 475. 
 9 See Kent, supra note 1. 
 10 Daskal, supra note 7, at 475—76. 
4 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLIV 
all over the world.11  Therefore, law enforcement agencies are 
forced, when they need to obtain data stored by these companies in 
gathering information on criminals they are prosecuting, to navigate 
the international legal system in order to work with other countries, 
where that data may be physically located, in order to obtain certain 
evidence.12  This is a particularly difficult task when considering the 
country in which the suspect is physically located, the country in 
which the data is stored, and the country whose law enforcement 
agency is conducting the investigation, all might be separate from 
one another.13  As a result of this dilemma, law enforcement 
agencies are forced to work with one another, each pursuant to their 
own domestic laws, in requesting and obtaining information on 
suspects they are investigating.14 
III. The Current Legal Framework for International Cross-
Border Data Sharing 
Currently, however, law enforcement agencies around the world 
struggle to obtain information on criminal suspects from each 
other’s foreign governments, intelligence services, and law 
enforcement agencies.15  This is primarily because the law that 
governs the handing over of personal online information between 
an online provider and a law enforcement agency is, traditionally, 
the domestic law of the country in which the information is 
physically located.16  Therefore, in addressing the need of law 
enforcement agencies to work together in sharing information 
across borders, countries have traditionally used MLATs.17  
However, as the frequency of these types of modern crimes 
increases, requests for information between countries has and will 
continue to increase as well.  As a result, navigating the MLAT 
process in obtaining information for ongoing criminal 
investigations has proven to be extremely burdensome and time-
consuming, and has been viewed as an inadequate solution to 
 
 11 Kent, supra note 1. 
 12 See id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Daskal, supra note 7, at 475—76. 
 15 Kent, supra note 1. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
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address ongoing and real-time threats.18  Thus, many countries, 
including the United States, have begun to develop alternative legal 
agreements to MLATs in order to more efficiently share 
information with those countries with whom they share information 
with most often.19  One example of such an alternative workaround 
to the MLAT process is the proposed agreement between the United 
States and the United Kingdom.20  The agreement would ultimately 
“allow law enforcement officials in the United Kingdom to wiretap 
or directly order companies to hand over user data stored in the 
United States—and vice versa—without going through formal 
processes.”21  The U.S. Department of Justice has advocated for the 
ability to negotiate agreements like the one between the United 
States and United Kingdom in its 2016 proposal to Congress.22  As 
is discussed infra, these types of MLAT workaround agreements are 
beneficial to law enforcement agencies who are straining to meet 
the challenges posed by modern crimes, and countries around the 
world, and the United States in particular, should negotiate these 
types of MLAT workaround agreements with one another. 
A. What Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties Are and How They 
Work 
Under the current MLAT system, in order to access any sort of 
electronic information stored by data service providers, including e-
mails, tweets, Facebook posts, etc., a country must abide by a 
specific MLAT that it has negotiated with the country which 
physically holds the information the former is attempting to 
obtain.23  Since most data service providers are based in the United 
States, countries looking to prosecute suspects within their own 
territorial jurisdiction must rely on a MLAT it has formed with the 
United States in order to obtain information located within the 
 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Drew Mitnick, A Diagnosis: Why Current Proposals to Fix the MLAT System 
Won’t Work, ACCESS NOW (May 2, 2017, 1:32 PM), 
https://www.accessnow.org/diagnosis-current-proposals-fix-mlat-system-wont-work/ 
[https://perma.cc/BSP7-8CC9]. 
 21 Id. 
 22 See DOJ Proposed Legislation, supra note 5. 
 23 Kent, supra note 1. 
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territorial jurisdiction of the United States.24  The long, attenuated 
process ultimately begins when the foreign law enforcement files a 
request with its country’s own central filing agency.25  That central 
filing agency then contacts the U.S. Department of Justice (if 
seeking to obtain information from a provider in the United States), 
who works with that country to make sure the request meets U.S. 
legal standards—that it complies with U.S. domestic law.26  
Following the reception of the request and satisfaction that it does 
meet the standards of U.S. domestic law, the Department of Justice 
passes it along to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the district in which 
the data provider is located.27  The U.S. Attorney then solicits a 
magistrate judge to receive a court order, and sends that signed court 
order to the U.S.-based company.28  Upon receiving the court order 
making the request, the company is then ultimately required to send 
any information along to the foreign law enforcement agency.29 
B. Issues with the Current Legal Framework 
Although the process may appear straightforward on paper, it is 
has proven to be extremely burdensome to both the U.S. Department 
of Justice and other foreign law enforcement agencies.  This burden 
is based predominantly on the fact that MLAT requests for 
information have increased drastically in the past few years.30  In 
2015, the DOJ stated in its fiscal year budget request that “request[s] 
for assistance from foreign entities ha[d] increased nearly 60%, and 
the number of requests for computer records increased ten-
fold[.]’”31  This increase in cross-border information requests puts 
an additional strain on the government entities responsible for both 
sending and receiving the requests, and as a result the time it takes 
to fully comply with a MLAT request is burdensomely long.32  For 
 
 24 Id. 
 25  See Tiffany Lin & Mailyn Fidler, Cross-Border Data Access Reform: A Primer on 
the Proposed U.S.-U.K. Agreement, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y 1, 2 
(Sep. 7, 2017, 3:20 PM), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33867385/2017-
09_berklett.pdf [https://perma.cc/N92L-UHY3]. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 2—3. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Lin & Fidler, supra note 25, at 4. 
 32 Kent, supra note 1. 
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example, the United Kingdom has reported that requests for cross-
border information via MLATs can take over a year—up to 13 
months.33  In addition, “[t]he UN Cybercrime Study of 2013 
indicates that most countries ‘reported median response times of . . . 
150 days for mutual legal assistance requests, received and sent . . . .  
It is clear that the use of formal cooperation mechanisms occurs on 
a timescale of months, rather than days.’”34  This issue is particularly 
apparent when law enforcement agencies are conducting ongoing 
investigations, in which they need particular information that not 
only supports the guilt of a criminal for a prior committed act, but 
in preventing the commission of future crimes as well.35 
The issues with MLATs extend far beyond the exorbitant 
amount of time they take to fulfill.  For one, countries around the 
world have grown increasingly frustrated that “U.S. law essentially 
determines global practices.”36  Since most data providers reside and 
operate in the United States, most law enforcement agencies will 
need to utilize MLATs they have negotiated with the United States 
in carrying out their investigations, and thus are subject to U.S. data 
privacy laws.37  Moreover, determining the exact location of the data 
can be difficult.38  Many providers, including Microsoft and Google, 
store data in various locations around the world in order to protect 
that data from regional political issues, for cost purposes, or for 
purposes of speed and efficiency.39  This is problematic because the 
data protection law that is applied in determining MLAT requests is 
the law of the jurisdiction in which the data is stored.40  Thus, issues 
related to data privacy and free speech arise when countries request 
stored online information from another country with substantially 
different domestic laws and protections than the requesting 
country.41 
 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See Daskal, supra note 7, at 480. 
 36 Lin & Fidler, supra note 25, at 4. 
 37 Drew Mitnick, What’s Wrong with the System for Cross-border Access to Data, 
ACCESS NOW (Apr. 25, 2017, 1:22 PM), https://www.accessnow.org/whats-wrong-system-
cross-border-access-data/ [https://perma.cc/5AZ2-XXGL]. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See id. 
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IV. Current and Proposed Solutions to the Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty Problem 
In response to these concerns, countries have taken a number of 
different approaches.  Some countries have begun imposing strict 
data localization laws, limiting the use of encryption to protect data, 
and passing new extraterritorial laws which permit their law 
enforcement agencies to unilaterally circumvent the law of the 
jurisdiction in which the data is stored, and to ultimately order the 
provider to hand over the data or face a penalty.42  Concerns have 
been raised, and rightly so, about these new techniques, which 
prevent consistency in cross-border data sharing, do not ensure 
adequate privacy safeguards of user information, put data providers 
in a legal stranglehold, and encroach on national sovereignty.43 
Other, more workable solutions have been raised however.  The 
most satisfactory of these is the use of unilateral agreements 
between countries themselves, which would permit the parties to the 
agreement to bypass the MLAT process entirely.  The agreement 
would allow one country to reach out to a data provider located in 
the other country, which is a party to the agreement, and submit an 
information request pursuant to the requesting country’s own 
domestic laws, and not the domestic laws of the country in which 
the provider is located or the information is stored, as was the case 
under the traditional MLAT regime.44  Thus, these sort of 
“workaround” agreements would subject foreign companies to the 
domestic laws of the country requesting the information in the first 
place, and not the domestic laws of the country in which the 
information is actually being stored.45  Presumably as a result of this 
new legal mechanism’s perceived usefulness, some countries, in 
addition to the United States and United Kingdom, have begun to 
draft proposals for new MLAT workaround agreements.46  For 
example, the European Union (EU) is currently “reviewing digital 
evidence rules that would apply to all EU countries, and the Council 
of Europe is in the early stages of negotiations to grant greater direct 
access to the countries party to the Convention of Cybercrime 
 
 42 Id. 
 43 Mitnik, supra note 37. 
 44 Kent, supra note 1. 
 45 See Mitnick, supra note 20. 
 46 Id. 
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(Budapest Convention).”47 
A. The Proposed 2016 Department of Justice Legislation 
The U.S. Department of Justice proposed legislation to 
Congress in July of 2016 that would allow and ultimately permit the 
United States to engage in negotiating these MLAT workaround 
agreements.48  According to the proposal, the United States would 
be permitted to enter into bilateral agreements with other countries 
(including the United Kingdom), and U.S.-based companies would 
be required to provide stored information to law enforcement 
agencies of countries parties to the agreement pursuant to the 
requesting countries own domestic law, and not the domestic law of 
the United States.49  United States courts would thus not have to act 
as an intermediary in reviewing, approving, and issuing a court 
order for every information request made by a foreign law 
enforcement agency, as is currently the practice under the traditional 
MLAT regime.50  Instead, companies like Google, Facebook, and 
Microsoft, who are headquartered and store information inside the 
territory of the United States would be subject to lawful requests 
made for that stored information, pursuant to the requesting 
country’s domestic law.51  The 2016 draft proposal sets out 
particular standards other countries must meet before the United 
States government could enter into such an agreement with them, 
and it “establishes parameters on what [type of information] the 
requests can include.  For instance, requests must pertain to a 
serious crime, including terrorism.”52 
The proposed legislation would also amend certain parts of Title 
III of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”).53  It 
would amend the Wiretap Act, Stored Communications Act 
(“SCA”), and Pen/Trap Statute—all parts of the ECPA—“to allow 
service providers to intercept, access, and disclose communications 
content and metadata in response to an order from a foreign 
government, if that order is pursuant to an executive agreement that 
 
 47 Id. 
 48 See DOJ Proposed Legislation, supra note 5. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Lin & Fidler, supra note 25, at 4—6. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 4. 
 53 Id. 
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the Attorney General, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, 
has determined, and certified to Congress, meets several statutory 
conditions.”54  These statutory conditions would be implemented to 
ensure that the requesting country’s domestic law affords 
substantial protection for the privacy rights and civil liberties of the 
American public.55  Included among these particular conditions are: 
“substantive and procedural laws on cybercrime and electronic 
evidence; evidence of respect for the rule of law and principles of 
non-discrimination, and adherence to applicable international 
human rights obligations; [and] mechanisms to provide 
accountability and transparency for data collection[.]”56 
Furthermore, the request of information itself must not infringe 
on an individual’s freedom of speech, it must be subject to review 
by a U.S. magistrate, judge, or other official, and it must be based 
on a sound legal justification and articulated facts.57  Finally, the 
foreign government must afford reciprocity to the United States by 
allowing it to submit requests for information pursuant to U.S. 
domestic law, the foreign government must agree to periodic 
reviews of compliance, and the requesting country must review for 
and delete any irrelevant information that was sent over.58  
Ultimately, if the United Kingdom, or any other country for that 
matter, could not successfully comply with the terms of the 
executive order, they would still have the option to request 
information through the MLAT process.59  However, this particular 
piece of legislation removes the requirement that the U.S. 
government personally review each new request for information 
from U.S.-based companies, which has proven to be a primary point 
of contention regarding the new legislation.60 
 
 54 Memorandum from Peter Kadzik, Assistant Attorney Gen., to The Honorable 
Joseph R. Biden (July 15, 2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum]. 
 55 Lin & Fidler, supra note 25, at 5. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 6. 
 60 Id. at 5 (“[O]rders do not undergo individual inspection by the U.S. government, 
making the vetting of countries for the executive agreement [like the one between the U.S. 
and U.K.] the single guaranteed point of scrutiny.”). 
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B. The Effect of the Proposed DOJ Legislation 
It is clear that a workable alternative to the current MLAT 
regime needs to be implemented, particularly since those situations 
which give rise to the need for any type of agreement in the first 
place—where a law enforcement agency of one country is forced to 
request information from a government or company in another 
country, outside of its jurisdictional bounds—will only continue to 
increase dramatically.  The proposed 2016 DOJ legislation provides 
an example of legislation that would permit a country, like the 
United States, to implement such an alternative.  Therefore, in 
underscoring the advantages and disadvantages of these MLAT 
workaround agreements as a whole, it is helpful to analyze the 
advantages and disadvantages of the DOJ legislation in particular, 
and the power it gives the United States to enter into such 
agreements. 
For now, the DOJ proposed legislation is sufficient as an 
alternative to the current MLAT system in that it addresses the key 
weaknesses of the current system.  This new piece of legislation 
would essentially do the following: (1) it would ease the burden on 
the U.S. government, and like parties to the agreement (e.g. the 
United Kingdom), in providing and receiving information pertinent 
to criminal investigations; (2) it would prevent U.S.-based data 
providers from becoming entangled in legal conflicts which may 
arise when one country’s law enforcement agency demands 
information that U.S. domestic law would otherwise not permit that 
company to produce; (3) it would ensure reciprocity for United 
States law enforcement agencies seeking to obtain information 
about their own ongoing investigations; and (4) it would create a set 
of norms and standards that both the United States and the rest of 
the world can use in formulating such cross-border data sharing 
agreements, while also preventing data localization and providing 
adequate safeguards for individual and civil liberties.61 
First, the most obvious advantage of these MLAT workaround 
agreements, generally, is that they greatly reduce the burdens that 
electronic communication service providers, as well as the 
governments of countries that are party to the agreements, face 
under the current MLAT system.62  The DOJ proposal in particular, 
 
 61 See Memorandum, supra note 54, at 1—3. 
 62 Id. at 1—2. 
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and ultimately the creation of bilateral MLAT workaround 
agreements themselves, would drastically ease the burden on the 
governments of the United States and United Kingdom, and like 
countries, in complying with the ever-increasing MLAT requests 
for information.  This legislation does this by removing the critical 
barrier of forcing the government in which the service provider is 
located to effectively scan the request and make sure that it complies 
with domestic law, which is the hallmark of the MLAT system.63 
This characteristic seems to be the most contentious, since 
advocates of these agreements see that element as the clog in the 
system, while opponents see that element as necessary for ensuring 
privacy and human rights.64  However, under the proposed 
legislation, just because the United States would no longer be 
responsible for “approving” requests for information from law 
enforcement agencies in the United Kingdom and other countries it 
enters into such agreements with, it does not mean that those 
requests will not still provide adequate safeguards for individual and 
civil liberties.  The proposed legislation would simply replace U.S. 
domestic law governing information requests with the law of the 
United Kingdom in this particular area.65  In addition, the proposed 
legislation comes with the added safeguard that the applicable U.K. 
law governing information requests from U.S.-based companies 
must be cleared by the Attorney General, “with the concurrence of 
the Secretary of State, to determine and certify to Congress that 
foreign partners have met obligations and commitments designed to 
protect privacy and civil liberties.”66  However, maintaining the 
current system, which puts the burden on the “home” country to 
give the green light for every request for information that the 
requesting country’s law enforcement agency has submitted, creates 
an unnecessary middleman in every single transaction. 
Second, companies would no longer find themselves caught in 
the “difficult [legal] position” of receiving a request for data that 
contradicts U.S. law.67  Under the current regime, U.S.-based data 
providers confront situations in which they “[e]ither comply with a 
foreign order, and risk a violation of U.S. law, or they refuse to 
 
 63 Lin & Fidler, supra note 25, at 4—5. 
 64 See Daskal, supra note 7, at 496—97. 
 65 Lin & Fidler, supra note 25, at 7. 
 66 Memorandum, supra note 54, at 2. 
 67 Id. 
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comply and risk violating federal law.”68  United States Assistant 
Attorney General Peter Kadzik notes, in his memorandum 
supporting the proposed 2016 legislation, that “[s]ome countries 
have [even] begun to take enforcement actions against U.S. 
companies, imposing fines or even arresting company 
employees.”69  Under the new legislation, companies would not be 
subject to both the law of the domestic territory in which they reside 
as well as subject to the foreign law of the country making the 
request.  They would only need to comply with the law of the 
country making the request, thus alleviating the legal stranglehold 
many companies currently face.70  In addition, under the proposed 
legislation, companies would have the option of complying with the 
information request or not, subject to their own determinations.71 
Third, the proposed legislation, and agreement with the United 
Kingdom arising therefrom, would ensure reciprocity for the U.S. 
law enforcement agencies seeking to collect data from providers 
located in the United Kingdom, or storing information in the United 
Kingdom.72  This would alleviate the burden on domestic law 
enforcement agencies seeking to obtain information pursuant to 
ongoing investigations. 
Finally, the proposed legislation would establish a “framework” 
to serve as the basis for other similar agreements between both the 
United States and other countries, as well as between other countries 
themselves.73  Assistant Attorney General Kadzik stated as much 
when he emphasized that this legislation would:  
establish a framework and standards that could be used to reach 
similar agreements with other countries whose laws provide 
robust protections of human rights, privacy, and other 
fundamental freedoms.  It could thereby increase protections for 
privacy and civil liberties globally, as countries seeking to qualify 
for such agreements would need to demonstrate that their legal 
systems meet these requirements.74 
 
 68 Id.at 1. 
 69 Id.at 2. 
 70 Lin & Fidler, supra note 25, at 7. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Memorandum, supra note 54, at 3 (highlighting that the proposed legislation 
would “[ensure] reciprocal access to data for U.S. investigations”). 
 73 Id. at 2. 
 74 Id. 
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However, many civil liberties groups, including the American 
Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), Human Rights Watch, and 
Amnesty International, argue that these agreements, and this piece 
of legislation in particular, do not go far enough in protecting 
individual privacy and civil liberties.75  However, safeguards do 
exist in the proposed legislation which require the Attorney General 
and Secretary of State to certify that the country with which the 
United States enters into an agreement provides certain safeguards 
and meets certain requirements.  It provides that any future 
agreements could be modified or extended based on the particular 
requirements and domestic laws of the countries with which they 
are entered.76 
Without a basis for creating a workable alternative to the 
currently unsustainable MLAT regime, a vacuum exists where 
countries, unable to meet or tolerate the demands of the current 
MLAT system will, and have already started to, revert to solutions 
that substantially reduce protections for civil liberties.77  One 
example of such a situation is the fact that certain countries, like 
Russia and China, have begun implementing data localization laws 
which require companies to physically store their data in that 
particular country’s jurisdiction.78  United States—based companies 
could instead store their data here in the United States and be subject 
to the legal requirements of a foreign government with whom it has 
already cleared as ensuring that their disclosure laws maintain 
adequate safeguards for civil liberties.  The alternative would be a 
situation where these “data localization laws” are passed and United 
States—based companies are forced to comply with the domestic 
law of countries that do not provide such adequate safeguards.79 
The former is simply a more viable alternative than the latter, 
both in terms of privacy and efficiency.  As one scholar notes, 
although the privacy protections afforded by other countries with 
whom the United States negotiates these agreements might not rise 
to the same standard as that articulated in the Fourth Amendment.80  
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But the Fourth Amendment should not be the benchmark since the 
alternative is exactly this sort of “data localization” in countries 
which are plummeting in the opposite direction of ensuring the 
privacy rights of the Fourth Amendment.  “As compared to that 
world[,]” he notes, this proposed legislation “offers privacy 
advocates quite a lot.”81 
Another concern has been raised about presidential powers.  
Specifically, what happens when the president of the United States, 
who would have the power under this legislation to enter into these 
bilateral MLAT workaround agreements, negotiates agreements 
with some countries but not others.82  This would leave some of the 
world’s biggest markets, such as India and Brazil, in the cold and 
would incentivize them to mandate localization.83  However, this is 
a risk inherent to any bilateral workaround agreement.84  It is safe to 
assume that world leaders, and the U.S. president in particular, 
would do all in their power to negotiate agreements with countries 
with whom U.S. law enforcement agencies most need information.  
A further solution is to permit the United States to negotiate these 
agreements with specific law enforcement agencies of countries, 
and not the country themselves.85  This negotiation might serve as a 
more “streamlined approached,” however, it is clear that while there 
are still wrinkles, these MLAT workaround agreements are the best 
alternative to the current system.  The 2016 DOJ proposed 
legislation in particular, is a step in the right direction. 
V. Conclusion 
Ultimately, there is still work left to be done, but the 2016 DOJ 
proposed legislation is the best alternative to the current MLAT—
regime.  One that has proven incapable of meeting the demands of 
law enforcement agencies around the world.  This proposed 
legislation, which would allow the United States to enter into a 
bilateral agreement with the United Kingdom and other countries, 
serves as an illustrative example of the advantages and drawbacks 
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of these types of MLAT workaround agreements.  While there is 
still room for improvement, among the many different things this 
piece of legislation does, it establishes a framework for other 
countries to use in drawing up their own bilateral agreements with 
the United States and others.  One thing, however, is clear—
something needs to be done to replace the current MLAT regime.  
One which has proven to be incapable of meeting the information 
sharing demands of law enforcement agencies in the twenty-first 
century.  These MLAT workaround agreements appear to be the 
most viable alternative. 
 
